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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On September 16, 2010, police presented an application for a search 
warrant for the residence of Amy Faye Greco. (See generally Warrant Tr.) 
Police Chief Dusty Tveidt testified that a relative of Greco named Mel reported 
concerns about drug-related activities within Greco's residence. (Warrant Tr., p. 
2, L. 16 - p. 4, L. 5.) Mel reported the Greco lived there with her grandmother 
and that he suspected her of stealing the grandmother's medicines because the 
medicines were gone when he or his wife visited to check on the grandmother. 
(Warrant Tr., p. 4, Ls. 7-12; p. 4, L. 19 - p. 5, L. 2.) He also reported persons 
coming and visiting Greco in her room for a couple of minutes and then leaving 
again in what Mel suspected were drug transactions. (Warrant Tr., p. 4, Ls. 12-
15.) Mel also reported that Greco had installed a video camera monitoring 
system whereby Greco could monitor activities outside of the residence. 
(Warrant Tr., p. 4, Ls. 15-18.) 
Chief Tveidt followed up on Mel's report, and police witnessed several 
different vehicles frequent the residence over the course of about a week. 
(Warrant Tr., p. 5, Ls. 3-12.) The police also received a report from the principal 
of Wilder Elementary that Greco's 11-year-old son  had been reported by 
fellow students to have been talking about smoking marijuana. (Warrant Tr., p. 
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5, L. 21 - p. 6, L. 3.) Health and Welfare reported that another child in their care 
had reported that  had been using threats to get other children to smoke 
pot. (Warrant Tr., p. 6, Ls. 5-10.) Chief Tveidt interviewed  who 
admitted smoking marijuana and having paraphernalia in his room. (Warrant Tr. 
p. 6, Ls. 11-25.)  also stated that every evening Greco is visited by "four 
to five" "friends" that come over and "go into a room for five minutes or so and 
leave." (Warrant Tr., p. 6, Ls. 18-22.) 
Based on this evidence the magistrate issued a search warrant. (Warrant 
Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-24.) While executing the warrant officers found 
methamphetamine, marijuana and paraphernalia. (R., p. 7.) The state charged 
Greco with possession of a controlled substance and injury to a child. (R., pp. 
22-23.) Greco moved to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the 
search warrant, contending that there had been an illegal warrantless entry prior 
to obtaining the warrant. (R., pp. 35-40.) Regarding that entry, the district court 
found the following: 
Chief Tveidt traveled to the subject residence. The 
defendant's grandmother answered the door. The defendant then 
stepped outside the residence to talk with Tveidt. The defendant 
consented to the search of her son's room. Tveidt then asked to 
search the whole house. The defendant did not consent and 
indicated that she needed to ask her grandmother for consent to 
search. The defendant walked into the house. Tveidt followed her 
inside without invitation. After entering the house the defendant 
went into her room and closed the door. Tveidt heard clanging 
glass and thought the defendant was destroying evidence so he 
ordered the defendant out of her room and then detained the 
defendant and a man, who was in her room, so law enforcement 
could obtain a search warrant. Tveidt entered into the defendant's 
room to check on the infant that was in the room, and at that point 
he saw the video monitor [Greco] had set up to view the perimeter 
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of the house. The monitor displayed Wilder patrol vehicles parked 
on the street in front of the residence. 
(R., p. 81.) The court concluded that because Greco consented to only the 
search of a single room and not a "search of the entire home" Chief Tveidt's entry 
into the home was "unlawful." (R., pp. 84-86.) Because Chief Tveidt was in the 
home unlawfully when he heard Greco potentially destroying evidence, the 
exigent circumstances exception did not apply. (R., pp. 86-88.) The court then 
excluded from the search warrant application the evidence of the monitor seen 
during the entry it found illegal and concluded the remaining evidence was 
insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant because Mel and 
Anthony's statements to Chief Tveidt were "uncorroborated hearsay" with no 
"indicia of reliability." (R., p. 89-92.) The state filed a timely appeal from the 
order suppressing evidence found in the execution of the search warrant. (R., 
pp. 97-99.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it concluded that consent to search one 
room of the house did not grant consent to enter the house? 
2. Alternatively, even if the entry into the home were illegal and all evidence 
found as a result thereof were excluded from the search warrant 
application, did the district court err by concluding the remaining evidence 
was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Entry Into The Home Was Within The Scope Of The Consent 
A. Introduction 
The district court found that Greco "consented to the search of her son's 
room." (R., p. 81.) However, because the officer lacked consent to a "search of 
the entire home," his "entry was unlawful." (R., p. 86.) The district court erred 
because entry into the home was within the scope of the consent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated: when a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. Consent To Enter The House Was Within The Scope Of The Consent To 
Search A Room Within The House 
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal 
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be 
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 
695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)). The courts have long approved consensual searches 
because "it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they 
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have been permitted to do so." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). 
The standard for determining the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of objective reasonableness. kl at 250-51. The question is 
what a typical, reasonable person would have understood by the exchange 
between the suspect and the officer. kl at 250; see also State v. Thorpe, 141 
Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 
251). 
Here it is undisputed that Greco consented to a search of her son's room. 
A typical, reasonable person would have understood that this would involve entry 
into the house. The district court's holding that Chief Tveidt exceeded the scope 
of the consent when he entered the house is erroneous and should be reversed. 
D. Exigent Circumstances Justified Ordering Greco From Her Room And 
Locating Her Three-Year-Old Child 
Exigent circumstances such as probable cause to believe evidence is 
being destroyed justify warrantless police action to preserve evidence unless the 
police have engaged in conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky 
v. King,_ U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856-62 (2011). Here the district court 
rejected exigent circumstances as grounds for Chief Tveidt's actions to preserve 
evidence and assure the welfare of a toddler solely on the basis that his initial 
entry had been illegal. (R., pp. 86-89.) As demonstrated, the initial entry was not 
illegal but was within the scope of the consent. Therefore the district court erred 
in rejecting exigent circumstances as grounds for exceeding the scope of the 
consent to make limited entry into Greco's bedroom. 
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Application of the correct legal standards to the facts as found by the 
district court shows error. Chief Tveidt did not exceed the scope of Greco's 
consent to search a bedroom of the house when he entered the house. The 
district court therefore erred by holding the entry was illegal and suppressing 
evidence flowing there from. 
11. 
Alternatively, The Search Warrant Application Established Probable Cause Even 
In The Absence Of The Evidence Found In The House 
A. Introduction 
The only evidence included in the search warrant application found by 
Chief Tveidt in Greco's house was his observation of a monitor showing activity 
outside the house. (Warrant Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-20.) Even assuming this evidence 
to have been improperly obtained by the police, excluding it from the warrant 
application shows ample evidence to establish probable cause. 
8. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing whether a magistrate court properly issued a search warrant, 
"the appellate court's function is limited to insuring that the magistrate had a 
'substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause existed, with great 
deference paid to the magistrate's determination." State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 
365, 369, 93 P.3d 696, 700 (2004) (citations omitted). See also Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983); State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 639, 873 P.2d 891, 
893 (Ct. App. 1993). In determining whether probable cause existed, the 
reviewing court should give preference to the validity of the warrant. State v. 
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Ledbetter, 118 Idaho 8, 10-11, 794 P.2d 278, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1990). See also 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (there is a presumption of validity 
in the affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant). A defendant 
challenging a search pursuant to a search warrant bears the burden of proving 
any constitutional violation. State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287, 141 P.3d 
1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Deemed Information 
From Mel And  To Be Unreliable 
"In determining the validity of a search warrant whose underlying 
application contains illegally obtained information, the ultimate question is 
whether the remaining information presented to the magistrate, after the tainted 
evidence is excluded, contains adequate facts from which the magistrate could 
have included that probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant." 
State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 779, 992 P.2d 769, 774 (1999) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 116, 175 P.3d 
801, 805 (Ct. App. 2007). Probable cause is based on "a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
before [the magistrate], including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213,238 (1983). 
Here Mel, a relative of Greco and her grandmother, informed police of 
suspected drug dealing activities by Greco within the house based on his and his 
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wife's observations. Specifically, Mel reported that Greco had a steady stream of 
casual visitors that would come, spend about five minutes with Greco in her 
room, and then leave again, and that Greco had set up video surveillance of the 
outside of her house. Both Greco's son,  and police observation 
confirmed the steady stream of causal short-term visits.  also provided 
evidence of his own marijuana use in the house and that paraphernalia was 
present inside. This created a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity 
was present in the house. 
The district court concluded the issuing magistrate could not credit Mel 
and Anthony's statements because there was "no evidence" that Mel was a 
"reliable informant" and Mel and Anthony's "uncorroborated hearsay statements" 
did not "bear an indicia of reliability." (R., pp. 91-92.) The district court's 
determination is directly contrary to applicable law. It is well established that 
information from a known "citizen informant," as opposed to an anonymous 
informant or member of the criminal milieu, is deemed reliable; the citizen's 
disclosure of his or her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the 
allegations turn out to be fabricated, is generally deemed sufficient to show the 
citizen informant's veracity and reliability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34; Dunlap v. 
State, 126 Idaho 901, 907, 894 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 1995); see also State v. 
Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-102, 15 P .3d 334, 336-337 (Ct. App. 2000). Because 
Mel's information came from a known citizen informant it was properly deemed 
reliable by the magistrate. Even if corroboration was required, Mel's information 
was corroborated by police observation (other than the existence of the monitor), 
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and Mel's and Anthony's statements, many of which were against Anthony's own 
interests, corroborated each other. The district court erred as a matter of law 
when it concluded that, absent the information of Chief Tveidt's observation of 
the monitor, information from Mel and  was not reliable. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2012. 
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